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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
CAROLINE P. JENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8708

GEORGIAN CORPORATION,
INCORPORATED, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant appeals from the verdict of the jury
rendered against her in the court below where she appeared as plaintiff. She bases her appeal upon certain rulings of the trial court on evidentiary matters and upon
one of the instructions to the jury and upon other instructions requested by her but not given as requested.
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The respondent concedes that many of the facts
contained in appellant's brief are correctly stated but
does not and cannot subscribe fully to the appellant's
statement of facts and in particular to the construction
which appellant places upon certain aspects of the evidence.
We will hereafter refer to the parties as they appeared
below.
It is agreed that the relation of landlord and tenant
existed between the parties and that upon the defendant's
premises laundry facilities had been provided by defendant
for the use of plaintiff and its other tenants. At the time
of her injury no one was present but the plaintiff and her
daughter. The only testimony in the record is to the effect
that plaintiff was injured when she tripped on a clean-opt
plug located in one of the rooms in the laundry area. This
plug was screwed into the top of the sewer line which ran
beneath the cement floor of the room. The plug itself was
metal and was flush with the floor except for a wrench
shoulder or collar about one inch square which protruded
above the floor surface a distance of one inch. The wrench
shoulder of the plug made it possible to remove the cleanout plug in case of necessity. At the time of her injury the
plaintiff and her daughter were in the process of doing the
family wash.
In addition to the foregoing facts which are not
disputed, the following facts, largely ignored or brushed
aside in plaintiff's brief, are of importance to a proper
consideration of the matters urged by plaintiff as grounds
for reversal.
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This clean-out plug had been installed in the defendant's premises at the time the building, an apartment
house, was constructed. The installation was in accordance
with plans and specifications prepared by a firm of licensed architects of long experience in the construction
of all types of buildings. It was also installed and maintained in obedience to the Provo City Plumbing Code. It
met the standards of good and accepted construction
practices, was properly located and was of the exact type
specified by the Plumbing Code. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 25'5258, 261-262,264-266, 277-279,288-291 and 293, Exhibit
D-12)
This plug was located in the laundry area as indicated
on plaintiff's Exhibit P-1 and was the only clean-out in
the entire area which consisted of three rooms. The east
and west rooms of the laundry were equipped with washing machines and tubs and the center room was for drying
clothes and had clothes lines. Clothes lines were placed in
all three areas for the use of tenants. (Tr. 31, 44, 78, 196,
202)
While it is not urged by defendant that plaintiff was
forbidden to use the west laundry room where she was
injured, it is, nevertheless, a fact that she could have done
her laundry without ever entering this west room. She had
been assigned by defendant's manager to do her laundry in
the east washroom, where the washing facilities were
better and more convenient for her to use, where there was
no clean-out plug. (Tr. 22, 31, 35, 39, 44, 71, 78, 88,
159, 196, 202, 215)
Contrary to plaintiff's contention, the clean-out plug
was not in the direct path of travel of tenants using the
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laundry. They were not under any necessity of stepping
over the plug in order to use the area. It was so located as
to be plainly visible and easily avoided by anyone exercising
reasonable care. (Tr. 77, 24, 28, 30, 43, 53, 76, 155, 198,
199, 212, Exhibit P-1) Plaintiff made no attempt to show
that the clean-out plug should or could have been located
in any other place than where it was. The demands of the
sewer system and the Code required it to be located in the
exact spot where it was placed. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 264,
269, 277, 278, 281, 289, 290, 291)
The plaintiff herself was well aware of the existence
and location of this plug. She and other witnesses testified that sometime before the accident she had tripped on
it without falling. (Tr. 119-121, 189, 199, 200) She also
claims that she had knowledge of others likewise tripping
on it. (Tr. 283)
Plaintiff was uncertain whether she should describe
the defendant's premises as being dangerous because of
the drainplug. Twice, in her testimony, she stated that she
did not consider them to be dangerous. (Tr. 199, 284) On
another occasion she asserted that the premises were dangerous. (Tr. 284)
On the night of the accident the plaintiff had been
in the laundry several hours washing and hanging laundry.
About an hour before she fell she was joined by her
daughter, Jessie, who came to her assistance. (Tr. 95, 96,
184) It was the custom for Jessie to hang the clothes when
she came to help the plaintiff. (Tr. 88) About eight
o'clock in the evening the plaintiff went into the west
laundry room to see if some of the laundry hanging there
was dry so it could be taken down and replaced with
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laundry which had just been freshly washed. At this time
the plaintiff had nothing in her hands as she proceeded into
this west room. It was while returning that she stubbed her
toe on the shoulder of the plug and fell. (Tr. 185, 198)
Prior to her fall plaintiff had made many trips back
and forth to the west laundry room without mishap. (Tr.
188, 200) She testified that she was always particular to
be on the lookout for the plug because she knew of its
existence and that it should be avoided. (Tr. 199) She
candidly admits that at the time she fell she was not paying the attention which she knew she should observe.
(Tr. 200, 206)
It was of particular importance that plaintiff should
be careful to avoid falls. She had an arthritic spine and a
fused stiff back of many years' standing. (Tr. 99, 105,
122, 145-147, 205-206) Because of this infirmity plaintiff was more susceptible to falls than otherwise and was
well aware of her condition and was constantly on the
lookout to avoid situations which would be dangerous to
one in her condition. As above stated, she admitted that
she was not observing her usual rule of care when she had
her accident.

One of the issues in the trial upon which plaintiff
placed great stress and which is argued at length in her
brief was the question of notice. It is asserted that the
type of clean-out plug involved created a hazardous and
dangerous condition; that defendant had been warned and
was well aware of the danger and recklessly did nothing
about it. It is further asserted that there was a history of
many people, including plaintiff, members of her family
and other tenants, having tripped on it. It is the con-
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tention of plaintiff that defendant had no right to use the
type of plug involved in spite of the plumbing code requirements and usual and customary building practices.
Five witnesses testified that on a few occasions they had
stubbed their toes on the plug but significantly none of
them had ever been hurt in so doing before plaintiff was
injured. (Tr. 26, 42, 73, 216) Two of these witnesses
never made any complaint about it or mentioned it to the
landlord at all. (Tr. 42, 79) Only two of them, plaintiff
and her son, claim to have made any mention of it to defendant's custodian. It was only mentioned by them on one
occasiOn.
The witness, Clegg, formerly employed by defendant,
testified that he pointed out the plug to defendant's president several times but this officer emphatically denies any
such notice having been given by Clegg. (Tr. 236, 238)
The only other fact of importance to this appeal is
that following the accident to plaintiff the drain plug was
replaced by one of a different type without a protruding
shoulder but having an inverted shoulder which created a
hole in the top of the plug the same size as the protusion of
the previous plug. This replacement did not comply with
the code and furthermore presented hazards as serious as
the plug over which plaintiff tripped. (Tr. 82, 216, 217,
223, 224, 273, 279}

It is the position of the defendant that this voluntary
change of the type of plug did not constitute any admission of liability nor prove that defendant was guilty of
negligence because it had not made the change before the
plaintiff was hurt. Nielsen v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc.,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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85 Utah 79, 38 P. 2d 743; Shearman and Redfield on
Negligence, Volume 1, Section 60, Page 171.

Much emphasis is placed upon the nature and extent
of plaintiff's injury. Since no question relating to damages
is presented in the grounds for reversal, defendant does not
deem it either necessary or appropriate to discuss this
subject.
It is perhaps idle to dwell upon what reasons prompted
the jury to decide in defendant's favor but it is obvious
that the jury either did not accept the plaintiff's contention that defendant was guilty of negligence or found that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. In any
event, the issues were found in defendant's favor.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING EXPERT
TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER CLEAN-OUT
PLUG WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PLUMBING CODE OF PROVO CITY OR BY
ADMITTING THE SAID CODE PROVISIONS IN
EVIDENCE OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY
THE TRIAL COURT IN ADMITTING EXPERT
TESTIMONY THAT THE SEWER CLEAN-OUT
PLUG WAS INSTALLED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE PLUMBING CODE OF PROVO CITY OR BY
ADMITTING THE SAID CODE PROVISIONS IN
EVIDENCE OR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 15.
The plaintiff urges that because the trial court admitted in evidence proof that the sewer clean-out plug
had been installed in compliance with the plumbing code
of Provo City and admitted into evidence the provisions
of said code and then gave Instruction No. 15 which recited the pertinent provisions of said code, grievous and
prejudicial error was committed.
In addition, the plaintiff makes the subsidiary argument that the code is inapplicable because it is asserted it
was enacted merely to achieve sanitation and health purposes and not to provide rules of safety to protect persons
such as plaintiff and hence was immaterial to any issues
involved in this case.
Defendant fails to see any relevancy to the distinction
sought to be drawn by plaintiff on the purpose of the
officials of Provo City in adopting the ordinance. It is
submitted that there is no competent evidence in the
record of the purpose of its enactment. The admissions
attributed to the witnesses Wood and Hodgson with re-
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spect to its purpose are completely incompetent and immaterial. These so-called admissions were solicited on crossexamination and are the mere conclusions of the witnesses
upon a subject upon which they were not qualified to give
any opinion. These witnesses were in no way qualified to
interpret the legal effect or purpose of the ordinance in
question and defendant should not be bound by the answers
which they gave on this subject.
The only relevant issues raised by plaintiff's argument
are whether the code provisions were admissible in evidence
and if testimony that the clean-out plug was installed in
compliance with the code was likewise admissible. If the
answer to these propositions is in the affirmative then the
plaintiff's argument is without merit. Plaintiff concedes
that there was no violation of the plumbing code by the
defendant.
The language of the code is couched in mandatory
language. It says:
((Clean-outs shall not be less in size than the
pipe served up to four ( 4) inch pipe. Clean-outs
for screw pipe and fittings shall be heavy cast brass
plugs with a solid wrench shoulder not less than one
inch thick and one inch high * * *"
The record is clear and without dispute that the
clean-out plug involved in this case was in exact compliance with this provision and that it was located properly
and that there was no other substitute permitted by the
ordinance. (Tr. 209, 210, 231, 255-258, 261-262, 264266, 277-279, 293, Exhibit D-12) No attempt was even
made to contradict this evidence.
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The law is clear that ordinances are admissible both in
cases of violation to prove negligence and in cases of compliance to prove absence of negligence.
In 65 Corpus Juris Secundum, Sec. 240, Page 1061,
it is stated:
((Evidence is admissible of the requirements of
a statute or ordinance and of the violation thereof
::- * ::· by a person whose negligence is in issue in an
action for damages ::· * ::·. Conversely, when the
negligence charged consists in the doing of a particular act or the employment of a particular
method, the provisions of an ordinance are admissible to show that such act or method was required
by its terms."
In Marshall v. Lyon, (Col.) 177 P. 2d 44, the defendant objected to the admission of a portion of a building code which the plaintiff claimed the defendant had
violated. That court said the objection made was untenable and stated:
((Since the ordinance was properly received in
evidence the trial court was correct in reading the
sections received to the jury with other instructions. * ::- * "
This authority clearly demonstrates that the plaintiff's
objections to Instruction No. 15 are without merit.
In Christensen v. Hennepin Transportation Co.
(Minn.) 10 N. W. 2d 40 6, the court said the following in
ruling that an ordinance may be proved as an evidentiary
fact to either prove or disprove negligence in an action for
damages:
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nit was not necessary to plead the ordinance.
An ordinance prescribing standards of conduct,
being an evidentiary fact in a negligence case, may
be proved, like any other fact tending to prove or
disprove negligence as an ultimate fact."

June v. Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. (Mich.) 205
N. W. 181, involved an action wherein it was claimed that
defendant was negligent for failing to blow a whistle or
ring a bell at a grade crossing. The question was whether
negligence could be shown for such failure when the provisions of an ordinance prohibited the use of whistles or
bells.
That court said:

HNegligence cannot be predicated on omitting
to sound the locomotive whistle, as its use in the
city is prohibited by the ordinance plaintiff invokes.

* *

~-"

And in Larson v. Lowden, (Minn.) 282 N.W. 669,
it was held that an ordinance prohibiting the unnecessary
ringing of bells and blowing of whistles on locomotives
within the corporate limits of the city could be shown as
an evidentiary fact in a negligence action without being
pleaded as any other fact tending to prove or disprove the
ultimate fact of negligence.
That court said:
((The cause of action was based on negligence,
not violation of the ordinance. An ordinance may
prescribe the duty of a party and is admissible as an
evidentiary fact for that purpose, both where the
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violation of the ordinance is asserted as a breach of
duty t~ prove negligence,* ~.. ~- and where compliance Wtth the ordinance is claimed as a performance
of ~uty to show absence of negligence. ~- ::- )'.- The
ord1nance, therefore, was admissible without having been pleaded in the answer, to show the defendants' duty with respect to ringing the bell and
blowing the whistle."
On the court's instructions in that case it was stated:
u::- * * The instructions are to be considered as a
whole. When so considered, they correctly informed
the jury that the failure to blow the whistle and
ring the bell alone was not negligence, since the
ordinance prohibited the giving of such .warnings
except when necessary as above st2ted, that defendants were bound to exercise due care in the
operation of their trains and that it was for the
jury, to say under all the circumstances whether it
was the duty of the defendants in the exercise of
due care to give a warning by ringing the bell or
blowing the whistle against immediate threatened
danger, if any, to the plaintiffs. * * *"

The case of Presley v. Kinloch-Bloomington, Ill. Co.
158 Ill. App. 220, was an action for wrongful death.
Plaintiff's decedent was killed while working on an electric
lamp when an electric wire broke resulting in the electrocution of the plaintiff's decedent. Plaintiff was permitted
to show that the proper method of stringing high tension
wires was to construct a guard or a net of wires to prevent
the upper wires from falling on the high tension wires
below. Defendant attempted to introduce evidence to the
contrary but was not permitted to do so. This was held to
be error.
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The court stated:
«Whether the maintenance and operation of
the wires were in accordance with the approved
and customary method and whether guards or netting was the usual construction were material issues
in the case. The defendants also offered in evidence
ordinances of the city which provided for the consolidation of wires on any pole or system of poles of
any other company, under the direction of the city
electrician; also providing how electric wires
should be insulated, and further that all telephone
and telegraph wires should be strung up on the
same set of poles so far as possible. The ordinance
in question tended to show that the method of
construction adopted by the defendant was, in part
at least, in compliance with the city ordinances, and
that the telephone company was compelled by the
same to use the pole in question. The facts shown
by the ordinance were material to the issues in the
case and it was error to refuse to admit them in
evidence."
In her brief, the plaintiff cites the case of McGettigan
v. New York Cent. R. Co. (N.Y.) 196 N.E. 745 to support her claim that the provisions of the ordinance and
evidence of defendant's compliance therewith were not
admissible. We submit this case is not in point. In that
case no issue was raised on the admissibility of the public
service commission regulation order in question. The court
simply said that the regulation and evidence of defendant's
installation of a crossing signal in the middle of a public
highway under legal authority, which was in evidence before the court, was not sufficient to excuse the defendant
from the claim of negligence.
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Furthermore, in that case the terms of the regulation
were not mandatory as is the case here involving the Provo
City Plumbing Code. The terms of that ordinance were
permissive only. There was left to the judgment of the railroad the exercise of some discretion as to where to place
the signals. On the other hand, the defendant here was
under a duty to comply with the provisions of the plumbing code which provided it with no alternative or discretion at all. In such circumstances certainly the provisions
of the plumbing code were at least entitled to be considered by the jury in passing upon the ultimate question
of the defendant's alleged negligence.
Before leaving this phase of the argument, defendant
desires also to point out that the uncontradicted evidence
in this record shows that the use and installation of the
clean-out plug was in accordance with good building and
construction practices. This evidence alone is sufficient to
support the verdict of the jury in defendant's favor.

Trame v. Orpheum Theatre Co. (Ohio) 21 N.E. 2d
178 at page 180:
u* * * whether the manner of construction was
reasonable and proper was a circumstance to be
considered by the jury in reaching its ultimate conclusion on the issue of defendant's negligence, and
that to assist it in reaching a proper conclusion it
was entitled to the benefit of the opinion of those
persons such as architects and builders having special familiarity with construction work."

Blinkinsop v. Weber, (Cal.) 193 P. 2d 96:
u* * ~'" The opinion of the expert as to whether
the steps were built in accordance with standard
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and accepted construction and architectural practice should have been received. His opinion thereon
might have been of some assistance in determining
whether the defendants were negligent in maintaining the steps. 'l- ~:- * Such evidence was proper
and relevant to an enlightened consideration of the
question whether appellant was negligent in the
maintenance of such a stairhead."
See also Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31,
232 P. 2d 210 and Presley v. Kinloch-Bloomington, Ill.

Co., supra.
The plaintiff next complains of Instruction No. 15 on
the ground that it merely recited the provisions of the
Provo City Plumbing Code without relating the ordinance
to the facts of the case.
Plaintiff bases her argument upon the erroneous
assumption that provisions of the code were immaterial
and, therefore, the jury was permitted to speculate that
the defendant was not liable because the clean-out plug
was installed as required by the code.
To support her position the plaintiff cites Meadors v.
Huffman, (Okla.) 127 P. 2d 806, where the court correctly ruled that the ordinance had no application to the
facts of that case. That being so, of course it was error to
admit the ordinance in evidence. On the other hand, in the
case at bar the direct issue involved was the alleged negligence of the defendant with respect to the clean-out plug
installed and maintained on defendant's premises. This
plug was the basis of plaintiff's claim of negligence against
defendant. That being so, it was highly competent to show
that the plumbing code required the use of the plug and
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that it was installed in compliance with the ordinance. It
was at the very least for the jury to consider the question
of whether the use of the plug required by law was negligence.
The case of Marshall v. Lyon, supra, is a complete
answer to plaintiff's argument. There the rule is announced
that it is proper for the court to read the sections of an
ordinance to the jury with its other instructions. See also

Larson v. Lowden, supra.
If anyone was prejudiced by the failure of the court
to relate the ordinance to the facts it was the defendant,
not the plaintiff. There is no ground upon which it can be
inferred that the jury did more than consider the ordinance
in connection with the issue of whether defendant had
exercised due care in using the type of clean-out plug
which the ordinance required. This the jury clearly had a
right to do and the verdict of the jury was in the affirmative.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
BY REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS 3, 5, 8, 11 and 12.
Plaintiff assigns as error the failure of the trial court
to give certain of her requested instructions. These requests will be discussed in the order appearing in plaintiff's
brief.

As to Instruction No. 3, it is claimed, in effect, that
since Clegg and Price were managers of defendant and
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were acting in the scope of their employment, any notice
to them of a hazardous condition would be notice to the
defendant. With such a proposition little quarrel could be
had but the request went further and stated as a fact:
H:z.
:z. ::- that they were each respectively given
notice by plaintiff and other tenants of the defendant of the existence and hazard of the protruding
floor plu§ ~~ ..the laundry area furnished by the defendant ··· -~ -~ etc."

Both the issue of notice and the existence of a hazard
were facts for the jury to find from a preponderance of
the evidence and were not the proper subject of a direction
by the court that the jury was bound to find that the condition in the laundry area was in fact hazardous, or that
defendant had notice thereof. This part of Instruction No.
3 was clearly error and was properly refused. If a portion
of an instruction is bad, the trial court is justified in refusing to give any part of it. Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande
Ry. Co., 44 Utah 100 at page 118, 138 Pac. 1185. It is the
position of defendant that the clean-out plug was not a
hazard as a matter of law. It was only one inch square and
only one inch high. By itself it presented no more of a
hazard than a stairway or a bathtub on which an injury
could be sustained and which in fact have been the cause
of many home injuries. Stairways, bathtubs and sewer
plugs are to be found in every building used for occupancy
by tenants. It could scarcely be claimed that because people
are injured in home accidents every day that having such
facilities constitutes negligence. They constitute the necessary components of modern living and the risk which they
entail is assumed by everyone.
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The court gave plaintiff all that she was entitled to in
instructions, in Instructions No. 2, 4 and 14. By Instruction No. 2 the court fully covered plaintiff's theory of
liability by stating that plaintiff was alleging:
u* * * that there was a metal plug protruding
above the surface of the floor; that the defendant
had known for more than two years was a dangerous condition and that it might cause injury to its
tenants using the basement laundry area * * ::-"

By Instruction No. 4 the jury was instructed that if
it found:
u* * * from a preponderance of the evidence that
the defendant was negligent as claimed and that
from a like preponderance of the evidence that
such negligence was the proximate cause of the injuries of the plaintiff * * *"

it would be the jury's duty to find for the plaintiff.
Furthermore, the plaintiff's theory of liability was fully
covered by Instruction No. 14. This instruction included
the statement that notice to the agent of the defendant
would be notice to the landlord.
It requires no citation of authority for the proposition
that where plaintiff's theory of a case is reasonably covered
the refusal of the court to give repetitious or additional instructions is not error. It is only where the jury is insufficiently advised of the issues to be determined or where the
jury is misled by the refusal to give an instruction that
error can be claimed. In re Richards Estate, 5 U tab 2a
106, 297 P. 2d 542. Harmless error is never ground for
reversal. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 5 was nothing
more than the academic statement of a legal principle and
was not related to any of the facts under consideration in
the case. Hence, the trial court properly refused to give it.
The substance of this instruction was fully covered by Instructions No. 8, 9, 12 and 21. Instruction No. 8 told the
jury that reasonable care did not impose the standard of
the extraordinarily cautious individual upon the plaintiff.
Instruction No. 9 told the jury that the caution exercised
by a prudent person varies in accordance to the known
dangers involved in an undertaking and is not a fixed undeviating standard. To the same effect was Instruction
No. 12. Finally Instruction No. 21 informed the jury
that merely to be absent-minded or to forget a known
danger was not necessarily to be considered as negligence
but was to be considered in the light of surrounding
circumstances.
Plaintiff in her brief makes the assertion that the evidence shows that she had no choice but to use the area
where the clean-out plug was located. This is plainly not
supported by the record. There were washing facilities provided for plaintiff's use which made it absolutely unnecessary for her to even go into the room where the plug was
located. (Tr. 22, 31, 35, 39, 44, 71, 78, 88, 159, 190, 202,
215) The record is conclusive that plaintiff elected not
from necessity but from choice to use the room for laundry purposes. This she did with the full knowledge of the
existence of the plug and that other persons had tripped on
it; (Tr. 283) and further, with the full knowledge that
a person in her condition might possibly be injured if she
tripped over it.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 8 was clearly in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

error. It stated that the plaintiff was not to be charged
with contributory negligence if. the evidence showed that
defendant failed to supply any other place in which plain..
tiff could do her laundry and that she was, therefore,
obliged to use the area where she was hurt. As pointed out
in connection with the argument on plaintiff's request No.
5, this statement was not in accord with the facts and
error would have been committed if this request had been
given. Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. The
essential and proper elements of request No.8 were covered
by instructions No. 2 and 4.
Plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 11 was a definition of reckless disregard for the safety of another. It is a
mere academic statement of a legal principle and was not
related to any of the facts in this case. It was objectionable
for the same reason that request No. 5 was bad and, therefore, the trial court properly refused to give it. There were
no facts upon which the jury could have found that defendant was guilty of reckless disregard of plaintiff's
safety. This court has defined reckless misconduct in
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. There it
was stated that recklessness is:
u* * * a disregard of consequences; an indifference whether a wrong or an injury is done or
not; an indifference to the rights of others and of
the natural and probable consequences."
Nowhere in this record does it appear that defendant
exhibited such an attitude as to be indifferent to whether
plaintiff or any of its other tenants might suffer injuries on
account of the sewer plug. Furthermore, it is submitted
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that there is nothing in the record to justify a finding that
defendant knew that the sewer plug created a hazard or
that defendant was aware its tenants were frequently tripping over it as argued by plaintiff.
On the other hand the jury was instructed that defendant was under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
prevent injury to the plaintiff. (Instruction No. 13) This
was a correct statement of the obligation resting upon
defendant. The jury by its verdict found that defendant
did not violate this duty.
Lastly, it is asserted that the trial court erroneously
refused plaintiff's request No. 12. This instruction in substance was intended to tell the jury that plaintiff was excused from the defense of contributory negligence if the
jury found by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant was guilty of ((reckless disregard for the plaintiff's
safety." We have already pointed out that there are no
facts upon which such a finding could have been made. We
defy anyone to point to any fact showing defendant's
((Disregard of consequences; an indifference
whether a wrong or an injury is inflicted or not; an
indifference to the rights of others and of the
natural and probable consequences."
Jensen v. Denver & Rio Grande Ry. Co., supra. All of the
proper elements of plaintiff's theory on contributory negligence were covered by Instructions No. 16, 18, 19, 21 and
22. In order to justify request No. 12 it would be necessary
as a matter of law to say that the jury could not find that
the sewer plug was installed in accordance with good building and construction practices; that it was not the type
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required by law which made no allowance for any other
kind of plug; that no person had been injured by it before
plaintiff was hurt and to affirmatively find that defendant
knew or should have known that it presented a probability
of serious injury to the plaintiff or others. Such facts simply do not appear in this record. For these and other reasons the request was properly denied. It may be true that
under proper circumstances contributory negligence does
not apply to a situation where injury is inflicted recklessly
but that does not en tide the party to such an instruction
where the evidence clearly does not justify its application.
Plaintiff concedes this proposition to be correct by quoting
the case of Beckstrom v. Williams, 3 Utah 2d 210, 282 P.
2d 309.
It is submitted that there is nothing present in plaintiff's argument which would justify even an inference that
the jury in this case was in any way misled by the court's
refusal to instruct or that the court's instructions omitted
any vital or necessary issue which the jury was bound to
consider which in any way prejudiced the substantial
rights of the plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
From the record in this case it clearly appears that
defendant was entitled to have the Provo City Plumbing
Code admitted in evidence and to show that the defendant
complied with its provisions in installing and maintaining
the clean-out plug. It was also proper for the trial court
to instruct the jury on the provisions of said ordinance.
The record further shows that no prejudice to the
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plaintiff occurred by the refusal of the trial court to give
plaintiff's requested instructions.
The jury having determined the issues in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff, the verdict and judgment of the trial court in this case must be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
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